CONFLICT ON RELIGION IN INDONESIA

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1.INTRODUCTION

In Indonesia, violence on behalf of religion has been ongoing for a long time, but the escalation of religious violence in Indonesia has increased sharply since the political reforms of 1998, along with the strengthening of the radical Islamic movement. Just three months after Soeharto Lengser, the FPI (Islamic Defender Front) was born. Until now, the FPI has been known as a radical Islamic group that frequently carries out violent acts against anyone deemed to be inconsistent with Islamic sharia. In August 2000, thousands of people came to Yogyakarta to attend the I Congress of the Mujahidin Indonesia Assembly (MMI), one of its recommendations being to make Indonesia more compatible with the Islamic sharia. MMI is known as an Indonesian radical Islamic organisation suspected of having networks with international terrorism.

Reports issued by several institutions show the high rate of religious violence in Indonesia post-reformation. The 2010 Moderate Muslim Society Report recorded 81 cases of religious violence. This report is, of course, not a perfect picture because not all regions in Indonesia are under surveillance coverage. Even in the monitored areas, not all cases of religious violence were For example, in a moderate Muslim Society report, East Java only recorded 4 cases of religious violence, while a 2010 Centre for Marginalised Communities report recorded 56 cases that could fall into the category of violations of freedom of religion and belief. Overall, the 2011 picture of religious life that appeared in the latest report at the
Centre for Religious and Intercultural Studies, or CRCS UGM, is not much different from the previous few years. This does not mean good news, but it shows that recently.

There are some key points outlined in this report. From the side of the question, the two main and often troublesome issues are the penalty of religion and the house of worship. Both have become major issues because, in recent years, conflicts around them have often turned into violence that has not been handled well. Similar views can also be seen in one of the assessments submitted by several civil society organisations. The Wahid Institute (WI), for example, every year. This report reaches DIY, Banten, West Kalimantan, West Java, Bali, Central Sulawesi, Lampung, West Sumatera, West Nusa Tenggara, Central Java, North Sumatra, Riau, South Sulawesia, and East Java. See Moderate Muslim Society, Tolerance, and Intolerance Report 2010 when the State Leaves Intolerances. See also Zainal Abidin Bagir dkk., Annual Report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2010; Teams, Religious Freedom/Beliefs, and Tolerance Report.

In fact, attaching religion to a potential variant that triggers violence is not easy. This is because religion is considered a teaching that is always associated with the values of peace and safety. In a violent act, there are things that can cause damage, destruction, or even death. A cold religious face is very unlikely to be associated with a hot face of violence. Facts often show that religion can trigger violence. Religious adherents make religious doctrines the primary drivers, the primum mobile, and the driving factor of the violence they commit.

Violence in the name of religion is often translated by some people as a doctrine of law to be enforced. Violence in the name of religion can be translated as violence involving religion as a premium variant. Violence is a nature or condition that contains force, pressure, and coercion. Religious issues are so sensitive to Indonesian society that actual social and political conflicts outside of religion are often drawn to religious territory to gain more support from its embrace. Religious conflicts sometimes still occur, including in the Reformation era, such as those between Ambon, Poso, Sampit, Ciketing, Yasmin, and others. These conflicts are not actually preceded by religious factors but rather by economic, social, and legal issues in general. However, the perpetrator involved religion to gain emotional support from a religious group. In this case, religion is seen as a unifying factor for certain
religious people, but it is also a factor of disintegration between different religious groups. From any angle, such conditions must be very detrimental to humanity in general and society and the Indonesian country in particular. They are stuck in a situation where it is very difficult to grasp the problem intelligently and, at the same time, become deaf to the inertia of finding solutions creatively, systematically, and accurately. Such conditions are detrimental to humanity in general and to society and the Indonesian country in particular. They are stuck in a situation where it is very difficult to grasp the problem carefully and at the same time, become deaf to the inertia of finding solutions creatively, systematically, and accurately.

2. CONFLICT IN THE NAME OF RELIGION AND NATION INTEGRATION

The classic definition of conflict, as proposed by Louis Coser, is: "a battle of values and demands to secure status, power, and resources; a struggle in which an opponent must neutralise, injure, or eliminate a rival." Based on several studies, such as the Religious Conflict Research Report in Indonesia (1990–2008), conducted by the Wakaf Paramadina Foundation in collaboration with the Gadjah Mada University's Master's Programme for Peace and Conflict Resolution (MPRK-UGM) and the Asia Foundation (TAF), this definition is considered too general and appears to be more based on the rationality of actions with political-economic motives. As evidenced by some studies.

Many acts of protest or violence associated with religious conflict originate from many religious and ideological sources within religion itself, and the rationality underlying the conflict is more expressive or symbolic; for example, as an expression of what is understood by the religious community as an "attack" on religious teachings or as a symbol of solidarity with the community. This may indicate one of the weaknesses in the various explanations of conflict phenomena, including the ethnic-religious conflict that is the area of study. As Jacques Bertrand puts it, "In general, theories of ethnic conflict have distinguished between
forms of conflict and developed better theoretical propositions about the causes of all forms. In a more general context, Bertrand

By emphasising the peculiarities of various forms of religious conflict or conflict with religious nuances, it can be explained why one form of religious conflict arises at a certain time and place while another form occurs at other times and places. The authors agree with Paramadina's team's research that hypothesises that religious conflict needs to be distinguished based on the type of religious issue that is the source of conflict. Therefore, in this article, "religious conflict" or "conflict with religious nuances" is meant as "enmity about values, claims, and identities concerning religious issues or issues framed in a religious slogan or expression."

The basic nature of man (human nature) wants harmony in life. John Burton, for instance, said that conflict is not human will. Therefore, conflict arises because of the socio-economic structure that encompasses human life, which triggers the birth of conflict, especially when the basic human needs it needs are not met. The imbalanced pattern of relationships in social processes between individuals is often the result of friction between interests that eventually creates an atmosphere of disharmony in the form of conflict. Thus, it can be said that conflict exists as part of a process of social change that is born out of the heterogeneity of interests, such as the importance of values and beliefs. Conflict is the polarisation of interests.

According to John Burton, there are two basic structures of human needs: the ontological need for security and the subjective psychological need to recognise the existence of human life. The other theory of human needs is the Galtung view, which states that the basic needs of man are survival, honour, identity, meaning, and freedom. In accordance with Galtung, Manfred Max-Neef stated that human needs consist of the need for subsistence, participation, rest, recreation, identity, and freedom. Human life is not free from conflict, so it can be assured that the age of conflict is the whole of human civilization. Conflict occurs because of differences, crossings, and movements. Values, cultures, and belief systems tend to classify societies within competitive and dominant group boundaries rather than
cooperative relationships. Dominant social relations will eventually give rise to traditional and primitive laws, namely, who is the strongest, who wins, and who makes the law.

Conflict is closely related to integration. This relationship exists because the process of integration is also a process of disorganisation and disintegration. The higher the degree of conflict in a group, the lower the level of integration. Theoretically, in group solidarity and outgroup conflict, there is a relationship of influence that influences each other. On the other hand, religion in the lives of modern industrialised societies is no longer comprehensively understood as the source of consciousness of the most important meaning for man and a source of legitimacy for society's life. Religion was then made only as a supporter of the spiritual life, which has undergone a positivistic reduction whose scope is so narrow, only touching the personal life of man.

Religion as a consciousness of the meaning and legitimacy of actions for its followers in its social interactions is just undergoing conflict of interpretation, so that is where conflict arises. Conflict between religious believers contains a complex load and does not touch the dimensions of religious belief. But also related to social, economic, political, and so on. Conflict between religious believers is so easy to ride on interest groups, so the conflict that occurs is a conflict of interests that overrides God and religion.

The real conflict arose because of the growing spread of structural-functional theoretical dogma, which, according to some social figures, is no longer considered aligned with social change and development. If so, then the theoretical construction will not help us understand proportionally and apply an event. (event). Consequently, the conflict that arises in a condition will be able to build a new awareness for a change in better and more dynamic conditions in society's life. Relationships and interactions between religious and other religious persons are not excluded from the theory of conflict and structural-functional integration, as previous authors have argued. The above question becomes increasingly complex and crucial when associated with the existing and developing social pranayats in society: whether what cannot be verified is considered untrue, so religion is considered wrong. But here what is meant is a religious understanding that is only narrowed to the doctrines of religious law, which are black and white. (berorientasi fiqh dalam istilah Islam).
Regarding the view of religious positivism, as discussed by the positivists, in particular Comte, which concerns the authority of truth and the salvation of claims, existing questions such as consensus, opposition, integration, and disintegration are the inevitable Sunnatullah in human life. Therefore, conflict and mutuality (integration) are the knowledge of God’s creation, which, in His word, creates everything in pairs. As previously stated, that theory of conflict arose due to the hegemony of the structural-functional theory paradigm. Structural-functional theory is a theory that emphasises the existence of order in society. According to this theory, a society is seen as a social system consisting of parts that are interrelated and united in balance. This theory has the assumption that each structure in the social system will function on the other, so if the functional structure does not exist, then the structure will not exist or disappear on its own.

Starting from the above, structural-functional theory can be simplified into a number of propositions. First, society is a combination of shared cultural values that are divided into social norms and strengthened by individuals as motivation. Therefore, the individual's social behaviour is actually stimulated from intrinsic values (inward) by a shared goal with others, in which all the social institutional structures in a system are expected to function as they should. All of this is based on the relational concepts between subject and object in the phenomenological language called intersubjectivity or the alterego world.

Second, social reality is the relationships that form a social system that has two distinctive characteristics: first, the concept of function is understood as a contribution to safety and resilience. This concept focuses on the course of the parts of the social system according to their interdependent functions and does not separate elements from each other. Second, there is the concept of maintaining balance as the primary characteristic of any social system. This concept is an expected goal with the assumption that interdependence is an effort of balance. Every change that happens will affect the rest. This is because it is impaired by the existence of conformity or consensus among members on certain values. Third, a society is a whole system consisting of interdependent parts. The whole system determines its parts. That is to say, one part cannot be understood partially and separately except through a relationship with the vast whole system, in which the parts become
elements. These parts must be understood as relevant to the overall system balance function so that they show symptoms of interdependence and mutual support to maintain the integrity of the system. Here, the phenomenological perspective affects the structural-functional theoretical views in sociology. Fourth, every society is a structure consisting of relatively strong and stable elements well integrated with each other. People work together more than they oppose, despite changes. People are expected to be able to perform tasks according to their respective functions so that the built-in system will run on its own.

Following the above signs, the relationship between religious persons, both religious and non-religious, in the perspective of structural-functional theory refers to the presence of structures and peace that can be created because all elements and parts are an inseparable unity, so that all religious persons in their religious social interaction will function according to their function. Even religious believers can realise the duties and functions of their religious execution, and other religious followers will also be aware of the existence of their functions.

Therefore, conflict is difficult to occur if all functions run in accordance with the consciousness of their task. Religion is no longer understood as belief but also as a guideline of life and human need for the importance of the religious significance of human life, so that relations between religious followers become peaceful and religion serves as a saviour and liberator truly running steadfastly with full consciousness for its followers. This is the creation of a religious creation without the existence of semu.

The interfaith community of religious people in Sidoarjo appears to have a close connection with the culture of Java and the coastline that loves the life of rukun. All religions that flourished in Sidoarjo could not abandon Javan and coastal traditions. Every religion is in dialogue with existing traditions. Even tolerance and confusion are not only the cultural heritage of Java but of Southeast Asia in general. Building consensus seems to be important in the culture of the people around us. Although there are some who argue that this is a myth or a religious way for immigrants to adapt to traditional attitudes and behaviours, The pattern of tension resolution with adjustments is very common in Sidoarjo. The Sidoarjo
community tries to maintain good relations with their neighbours so that there is no tension or conflict.

Facts about Religious Violence

As mentioned earlier, generally speaking, the 2011 picture of religious life that appeared in the latest report at the Centre for Religious and Intercultural Studies, or CRCS UGM, did not differ significantly from previous years. On the other side of the question, there are still two primary and often problematic questions, namely the temptation of religion and the house of worship. Both have become major issues because, in recent years, conflicts around them have often turned into violence that has not been handled well. The issue of violence should be emphasised here, not because the pattern of religious relations in Indonesia is dominated by violence, but vice versa. As repeatedly stated in the report, if violence did not exist, the record of Indonesian religious life would not look bad. We do not need to expect that in a very diverse society consisting of individuals and groups with different identities, tension or conflict will never occur. But we must continue to strive for violence not to be a mode of interaction in tackling diversity. Just days after the release of the 2010 Annual Report on Religious Life on February 1, 2011, the expectations of a decline in violence in 2011 were immediately rejected. The old Ahmadiyah case reached a dramatic new level of violence; three Ahmadi were brutally killed in Cikeusik, and the following week several public facilities, including churches, became mass targets in Temanggung after the trial of the religious misconduct case had ended. At the end of the year.

During 2011, the SETARA Institute recorded 244 incidents of violations of freedom of religion or belief involving 299 forms of action, spread across 17 monitoring areas and other areas outside the monitoring area. There are 5 provinces with the highest rate of violations: West Java (57), South Sulawesi (45), East Java (31), North Sumatra (24), and Banten. (12).

Five people were wounded and three people were killed in the face of the attacks of hundreds of masses incited by hatred because of differences in views in religious life. Instead of enforcing fair laws and issuing policies that guarantee more religious freedom, after the Cikeusik events, the state issued policies that increasingly discriminate against Ahmadiyah. In March of the same year, the government issued Governor's Decree No. 5/2011 (Pergub),
which prohibited the activities of the members and/or managers of the Ahmadiyah Church of Indonesia (JAI). In the same month and year, the Office of Governor Banten continued with Jabar Pergub No. 12 of 2011 on the prohibition of JAI activities. It was then strengthened by several similar rules at the level of the city, namely in the cities of Bogor, Banjar City, and Bekasi City. In West Java, Pergub and SK Mayor of the City were then legitimised for the practise of forced assertion out of Ahmadiyah, which in some areas involved TNI through the Sajadah Operation. In addition to West Java, after the Cikeusik events, similar regulations were also issued by governments in South Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, East Java, and West Sumatra. Not less than 11 discriminatory laws against Ahmadiyah were published in 2011.

The rise of discriminatory legal products and attacks on Ahmadiyah followers is not exempt from the strategy of the third wave of religious radicalism. In its research on religious radicalism and its implications for guaranteeing freedom of religion or belief in Jabotabek and West Java, the SETARA Institute analysed at least three waves of Islamic radicalization in Indonesia. 32 The first wave of horizontal religious nuances in Maluku and Poso (1999–2002) changed the way we view religious and societal tensions across Indonesia. The second wave is the positivization of Islamic law in the form of regional regulations based on religion and morality. Positivism in Islamic law also occurs in a number of laws, including the Sharia Banking Act (2008) and the Pornography Act (2008). As of 2010, the Women’s Chamber recorded 189 policies that refer to morality and religion. The third wave was an attack on the sect considered to be misguided, antichrist, and antimaksist.

According to the SETARA Institute, in recent years, the Indonesian society that has experienced the most discrimination and violence related to the assumption of the flow of misery is the Ahmadiyah community. In this third wave, the oramas that are intolerant to Ahmadiyah work through the intrusion of MUI, which in one of the speeches of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is considered to be the oramas to be heard by his fatwa about Islamic Akidah. 33 It also expands support for other Islamic leaders and non-radical
organisations. The intrusion and alliance were made to gather support for urging the state
to adopt policies that are intolerant of Ahmadiyah’s existence, ranging from policies at the
national level to those in villages. Even radical groups have made alliances with political
elites who are willing to build political contracts to discriminate against Ahmadiyah. In
addition, they developed an inter-city or regional network to support each other in the
programme of spreading hatred through tablig, forcing assertions out of Ahmadiyah, and
attacking Ahmadiyah followers. They also use one attack event as a threat and even a
platform to attack elsewhere. Among them, attacks in Parung, Bogor, and West Java were
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Through this way of working, dozens of discriminatory regulations against Ahmadiyah
were issued by the Indonesian government at the central, provincial, and village levels. The
application of these rules is even more discriminatory than the substance of their
regulations. Ormas who refuse to live with Ahmadiyah continue to encourage the
government to make intolerant rules, then use those discriminatory rules as the basis of their
violent actions.

CONCLUSION

Religious misconduct in Indonesia still seems to be a serious problem in society.
Religious communities in Sidoarjo, despite the appearance of rukun and peace, still have
potential for conflict. The conflict between religious groups continues. Opposition can occur
because of misunderstandings, interests, and ideologies. Misunderstandings can occur
because of religious prejudice. And the government is still very much needed to engage in
the assembly of religious people. This nation is still in the process of growing up to live in
peace. Inter-religious dialogue efforts also tended to be elite. This is seen in the minimal
involvement of grassroots society in dialogue. The activity of religious dialogue also tends to be normatively theological. Thus, it is not a solution to the social problems that are raised but rather a lot of debate about the doctrines that are produced, as a result of which, in practical terms, it does not produce much of the benefits produced by society. Religious leaders may often meet, but not to discuss religious groups but to discuss political, economic, etc. matters. In addition, the government has often held dialogue between religious peoples, appearing not to touch the roots of the existing problem. For this reason, interreligious dialogue should not lose its spirit and not only be of a ceremonial nature that looks dry and boring but really touches on existing issues such as mutual respect, interaction, tolerance, etc.

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